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Categorical and Individualized RightsOrdering on Federal Habeas Corpus
Daniel B. Yeager*

Introduction
When courts talk about whether to upset a state prisoner's criminal
conviction, any consideration beyond the guilt of the defendant begins to
sound like makeweight.) This applies not only to defenders' favorite soft
variables 2 -dignity, privacy, and adversarialness-but prosecutors'
also-federalism, inter-court friction, and finality-as well as to those soft
variables both sides share-deterrence, timeliness, and procedural regularity
A prisoner is substantively guilty when the evidence shows that she
committed the crime for which she is being punished. 3 The court's concern
is with the unexcused, unjustified, not-inadvertent conduct for which the
prisoner was arrested, not with the actions of her captors, prosecutors,
judges, or attorneys. But, unless the defendant pleads guilty, substantive
guilt is not enough to support a conviction. For that, courts also require
* Associate Professor, California Western School of Law. I thank Barry Friedman,
Paul J. Gudel, F Philip Manns, Jr., and Toni Marie Massaro, who kindly took time out from
projects of their own to comment carefully on the ideas presented in this Article. Karen
Beretsky's research assistance was indispensable; I will miss her.
1. See Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the
Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REv 1229, 1268 n.177 (1983) ("Preservation ofjudicial integrity, if
not entirely out of judicial favor, is little more than a makeweight argument.").
2. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court'sDue ProcessCalculusforAdministrative Adjudication in Mathews v Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of a Theory of Value, 44
U. CHI. L. REv 28, 48 (1976) (for procedural due process, "utilitarian calculus tends, as
cost-benefit analyses typically do, to 'dwarf soft variables' and to ignore complexities and
ambiguities"); Louis M. Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of
Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv 436, 485-86 (1980)
(difficulty in quantifying soft variables explains tendency to understate their significance).
3. See Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functionsof CriminalProcedure:The Warren
and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L.J. 185, 214 (1983) ("factual guilt" is
misnomer).
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legal guilt, which is substantive guilt "demonstrated in a forum, the
criminal trial, that has the competence and inclination to apply factual guilt
defeating doctrines that protect the accused and the integrity of the
process.

4

If the state trial forum fails in that role and that failure contributes to
the verdict or involves one of those exotic rights whose violation is never
forgivable, state appellate courts will order the process re-done. 5 If the
state appellate courts rule against the defendant, she can present her federal
constitutional claims to a federal district judge, who, in deciding whether
to grant a petition for habeas corpus, 6 acts very much like an appellate
court. 7 The redundancy of process excites a range of questions: What are
state prisoners doing in federal court? Why doesn't res judicata apply 9
What about the prisoner who failed to preserve her claim, or argues that the
law has changed in her favor since her conviction, or presses for a change
now 9
In answering these questions, no one argues that a prisoner should be
allowed "to retry the issue of [her] guilt on each day of [her] confinement." '8 Nor is there much lobbying for giving up altogether on the
"cumbersome adversarial determination of guilt at trial" in favor of "the
informal, ex parte, administrative factfinding of the police and prosecutor."' In their place, the Supreme Court and legal commentators have
proposed less catastrophic choices. On the left end of the spectrum is the
giddy optimism of Brown v Allen's"0 habeas-for-everyone; on the

4. Id. at213; see HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 166

(1968); Larry W Yackle, Form and Function in the Administration of Justice: The Bill of
Rights and FederalHabeas Corpus, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF 685, 691 (1990).
5. See Arizona v. Fulmmante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264-65 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
(only "structural" errors require automatic reversal).
6.
7
(1988).

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
See Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV 247, 274-76

8. Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword:The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process
of Time and Law, 79 HARv L. REv 56, 79 (1965).
9.

Arenella, supranote 3, at 210 (citing PACKER, supra note 4, at 160, 162).

10. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).

11. See Brown v Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 485 (1953) (any claim of constitutional
deprivation is within reach of writ of habeas corpus).
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right, the "epistemological skepticism" of curtain-closing naysayers, who
see one reasoned resolution in a court of competent jurisdiction-which
could be the state trial court-as all the process that is due.

2

The mainstream conception of habeas is somewhere in between.
Some redundancy in criminal cases is a given, even for those who push for
court-initiated appeals. 3 Despite the special status of criminal cases, our
system of party-imtiated review, with its endless reruns and lack of
meamngful laches, "is deficient as a process."' 4 Yet, if some limits on
access to review are as necessary and evil a part of federal review of state
convictions as negotiated guilty pleas are of the right to trial by jury, 5
then how much is "some" 9
To limit access to review and raise the obstacles to relief when
review is granted, the Court calls some rights core,' 6 which means
"important," and some "prophylactic,"' 7 which means "not important."
Likewise, a "personal trial right"'" is good, but a "judicially created
remedy"' 9 is bad. "Structural" rights are more important than those

12. See Withrow v Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1767-68 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Seidman, supra note 2, at 458 (citing Paul M. Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw and Federal
Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,76 HARV L. REv 441, 463-99 (1963)); see also infra
note 114.
13. See Harlon L. Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95
YALE L.J. 62, 102 (1985) ("[B]efore it officially stigmatizes a citizen as standing outside the
law and as deserving of society's condemnation, the state must satisfy itself several times over
that such a judgment is warranted.").
14. Arenella, supra note 3, at 221 (quoting Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and
Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "ProcessValues", 60 CORNELL L. REV 1, 27
(1974)).
15. We need plea bargaining because providing jury trials for all defendants who wish
to contest their guilt is too expensive. See Arenella, supranote 3, at 220 (quoting LLOYD L.
WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS INTHE UNITED STATES 82 (1977) ("We
can offer a trial to all only if few accept the offer.")); see also Keeney v Tamayo-Reyes, 112
S. Ct. 1715, 1718 (1992) (relitigation in federal court "places a heavy burden on scarce
judicial resources"). Not everyone agrees that limits on habeas review are necessary See
Yackle, supra note 4, at 704-05 (number of petitions increased by 36% between 1978 and
1987, but prison population increased by 94%).
16.

Brecht v Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993).

17

New York v Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984).

18.

Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 376-77 (1986).

19.

United States v Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).

51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 669 (1994)

involving the "presentation of the case to the jury "20 Old rules, 2 issues
of law,' and strict liability' trump new rules,' issues of fact,' and
errors requiring some level of governmental culpability 26 Finally, claims
that assert a defendant's "actual innocence," 27 particularly when "individualized' 2 s rather than categorical, 29 are best of all.
Individualized claims ask whether the defendant is substantively
innocent, not whether she is the victim of constitutional error at the
investigative, proof, or appellate stages of her case. Under an individualized approach, what the defendant did to get arrested is more important
than what the government did to catch and convict her. Categorical claims,
conversely, focus on the claim, not on the defendant's putatively criminal
act. The consequences of constitutional error under a categorical approach
depend not on the strength of the untainted portion of the State's case, but
on whether police, counsel, and the court obeyed constitutional norms.
This Article criticizes the Supreme Court's treatment of both
individualized and categorical bases of relief on federal habeas corpus.
Part I notes the Court's trend toward trimming the process that is due in
criminal and prisoner litigation generally This trend may explain the drop
in process on habeas as well, but generally declining process cannot explain
which rights, if any, should survive the decline. That would require our
weighting, if not reconciling, accuracy and dignitary norms, which is the
subject of Part II. In Part II, I examine Withrow v Williams,30 a case
from the Court's 1992 Term, which, for reasons that are not altogether

20. Arizona v Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264-65 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
21.

See Stringerv Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1135 (1992).

22. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2489 (1992).
23.

See generally Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

24. See Teague v Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (plurality opinion).
25. See Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963).
26.

See Daniels v Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986).

27

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986).

28. McCleskey v Zant, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1471 (1991).

29. See Stone v Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490-91 (1976).
30.

113 S.Ct. 1745 (1993).
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clear, preserved federal habeas review of state prisoners' claims that their
confessions violated the familiar Mirandarules.3
Part I tracks the Court's last three decades of rights-ordering on

habeas corpus. From 1965, when the Court began the ongoing struggle with
the concept of retroactivity, 2 through the evolving and ubiquitous raise-orwaive and harmless error doctrines, the Court's search for accurate verdicts

has made an unconvincing case for treating some rights better than others.
Indeed, next to the five other habeas cases argued in the 1992 Term, the
Withrow case looks comparatively thoughtful and "Supreme." 33 Ultimately, Withrow shows that barring the federal courthouse door to any constitu-

tional right is far from light work, especially as long as procedure seeks to
promote competing ideals like dignity, accuracy, and procedural regularity

But to say that reconciling competing values is difficult is not to say that the
Court's attempts at doing so have been good. Rather, the Court continually

treats some claims and claimants as superior to others for reasons that lack
adequate explanation.
This Article concludes that if too many prisoners sue for their
freedom, then categorical decisions of inclusion and exclusion of classes of
claims would be a more principled form of winnowing out undeserving

claims than that which the current, individualized regime provides. To be
sure, ordering rights so as to bar some rights from federal review would be

difficult-difficult enough that I make no attempt to answer how to select
rights for sacrifice, other than by recognizing, as others have, that some outof-the-courthouse executive behavior might be adequately redressed without

31. See Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,478-79 (1966) (statements taken in setting
of custodial interrogation not preceded by warnings and valid waiver of rights to silence and
to counsel are presumed to be compelled and thus inadmissible).
32. See Linkletter v Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-29, 63640 (1965); see also Teague
v Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-316 (1989) (plurality opinion).
33. Collectively, those cases tolerated misleading jury instructions issued at the guilt,
see Gilmore v Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112,2117-19 (1993), and penalty, see Graham v Collins,
113 S. Ct. 892, 903 (1993), phases of criminal trials, redefined ineffective counsel in a
manner stingy enough to distort accuracy, see Lockhart v Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 842-44
(1993), and reviewed the impact of constitutional trial error under a standard previously
reserved for nonconstitutional error, see Brecht v Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1721-22
(1993). Each mentioned the importance of accurate verdicts, but that commitment never rose
above the blurbish (e.g., one sentence in a 32 page case), see Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 903, and
the smug (e.g., the unconstitutionality of executing the innocent has "elemental appeal"), see
Herrera v Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 859 (1993).

674
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the habeas remedy ' What matters more is that those hard choices, if
made, could vindicate more prisoners than does the Court's increasingly
individualized approach to the review of crmunal convictions and sentences,
an approach that too rarely forms the basis of a prisoner's release from
custody 35

L Rights-Orderingand the Declining Value of Process

The Court's articulation of criminal defendants' postconviction
remedies 36 looks like a sort of triage, 37 likely designed to give states their
due and to preserve limited federal resources for those most deserving.38
34. So long as rn-court consequences are to influence out-of-court actors, the spectre
of alternative remedies will continue to haunt those rights m their quest for full respect at trial
and thereafter:
rights as either promoting
We recognize the perils of trying to categorize
fair and accurate adjudication or remedying out-of-court conduct. Yet we see
no alternative to drawing that distinction m this context, and can think of no
better way to frame the question than to ask whether the judicial conduct in
question would compromise the fundamental fairness of the trial and thereby
deprive the defendant of due process of law. In borderline cases, this question
will have no clearly correct answer.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, NewLaw, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARv L. REV 1731, 1775 (1991).
35.

See infra notes 73, 283 and accompanying text.

36. See Habeas CorpusLegislation: Hearingson H.R. 4737, H.R. 1090, H.R. 1953,
andH.R. 3584 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,IntellectualProperty,and the Administration
of Justiceof the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 159 (1990) (statement
of Chief Judge Gilbert S. Merritt, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit)
("The Bill of Rights establishes the rights. Habeas establishes the remedy When you
weaken the remedy, it leaves the rights unenforced.").
37 See Fay v Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 446 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting); Donald P Lay,
The Writ of HabeasCorpus:A Complex Procedurefora Simple Process, 77 MINN. L. REv
1015, 1021 (1993) (At the time of Brown v Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), state prisoners had
filed only 541 habeas petitions. In 1961 there were 1,020 petitions, in 1970 there were
9,063, and in 1991, 10,325.). But cf. Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L.J.
941, 1058 (1991) ("Instead of making an explicit decision about allocation of a resource," the
Court examines claims and claimants in terms of their "worthiness[, which] makes the
resource apparently available to everyone who is worthy of it.").
38. Defendants themselves have reason to endorse triage as well, if only to give the
limited Article I resource the time to approach criminal cases carefully enough to counter
prosecutors' strong-party advantages. See Gilbert S. Merritt, The DecisionMaking Process
in FederalCourtsofAppeals, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385, 1394-95 (1990) (deference to authority
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Yet, rarely does the Court declare right A to be more important than right
B;39 indeed, the Court goes out of its way to do quite the opposite:
We here stress that the choice between retroactivity and nonretroactivity
in no way turns on the value of the constitutional guarantee involved.
The right to be represented by counsel at trial
has been described
as "by far the most pervasive
[o]f all of the rights that an
accused person has." Yet Justice Brandeis even more boldly characterized the immunity from unjustifiable intrusions upon privacy, which
was denied retroactive enforcement mLinkletter, as
"the right most
valued by civilized men."
[W]e do not disparage a constitutional
guarantee m any manner by declining to apply it retroactively o
This passage, written by Chief Justice Warren, seems uneasy about its normducking explanation, and for good reason: A system that treats some rights
more deferentially than others is necessarily evaluative; here, by saying
some rights command retrospective application while others do not.4 But
ordering rights is a fact of constitutional litigation. Even those who oppose
rights-ordering "envision something other than a featureless plane of
undifferentiated rights" where, for example, the Second and Tenth Amendments are considered just as important as the First and Fourteenth.4 2 While

of state who is party to suit against individual and "[t]he need for haste may make [a] court
search for 'safe' rather than just decisions and may push the process toward ritual rather than
reflection").
39. Compare Withrow v Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1767 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (denying that his approach to habeas deems some claims "particularly worthless")
with Brecht v Abrahamson, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1728 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) ("Our
habeas jurisprudence is
a confused patchwork in which different constitutional rights are
treated according to their status, and in which the same constitutional right is treated
differently depending on whether its vindication is sought on direct or collateral review ").
40. Johnson v New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966) (first alteration in original)
(citations omitted); see Michigan v Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 455 n.2 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Michigan v Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 55 n.10 (1973).
41. Cf.James B. Haddad, "RetroactivityShould Be Rethought" A Callforthe End of
the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRim. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 417, 433 (1969)
("[O]nce it has been decided that some constitutional rights will be treated differently from
others in that only some will receive retrospective application, no better distinction exists than
one based upon the reliability function of the various constitutional safeguards.").
42. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural
Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CI. L. REv 679, 706-07 (1990); cf. Fallon &
Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1808-09 n.425 ("limited differentiation is appropriate").
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the Constitution and Congress do not authorize a hierarchy of rights, they do
not prohibit one. Accordingly, some ordering is likely valid, even if unwieldy
43
or unwise.
The hierarchy of rights could begin with the substantive criminal law,
which is concerned with prevention, control, and deserts. But because
predicting dangerousness and influencing would-be criminals' conduct through
the criminal law are entirely speculative, coupled with the fact that even strict
retributivists would stack the deck in favor of false acquittals,' and because
the criminal law entails governmental protection from private actors rather
than from the government itself, the crimmal law's justifications offer our
hierarchy little guidance. 45 The shape of the hierarchy becomes clearer
when we consider the procedural goals for enforcing substantive norms.
For the past two decades, the High Court has emphasized the need for
accurate verdicts.'
For the Court's critics, there are more important
goals, 47 such as preventing unjust punishment (even in investigatory practices)' and competing, nonistrumentalist goals like participation and equality I Accuracy is important under any view, but the Court has yet to come
up with a coherent, accuracy- or result-based theory of criminal procedure.'

43. See Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 42, at 709-10. The hierarchy has articulate
opponents both on the Court, see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1725 (1993) (White,
J., dissenting); Smith v Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 542-46 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 520-22 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923) (Holmes, J.), and off the Court, see Friedman, supranote 7, at 319-22;
Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless ConstitutionalError,88 CoLUM. L. REv 79,
88-91 (1988).
44. Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward
a Unified Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF 591, 611

(1990).
45. But cf. Seidman, supranote 2, at 441, 497-501 (Burger Court's main goals of crime
prevention and control explain its obsession with procedural regularity).
46. See generallySpecial Issue, 'Truth in CrinnalJustice'Seres,22 U. MICH. J.L. REF
395 (1989).
47 Cf. Barry Friedman, Habeasand Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REv 797,816(1992)("lAin
innocence approach finds no support in the [habeas] statute, and its only historical pedigree is
a 21-year-old law review article.").
48. Dnpps, supra note 44, at 612-13.
49. Arenella, supra note 3, at 201.
50. See Seidman, supra note 2, at 459-83; Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in
ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure,91 COLUM. L. REv 1369 (1991); cf. Robert M. Cover
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Some rights contribute more than others to accurate verdicts; plus, values
other than accuracy also matter, even though finding which of those is
captured by any given set of facts is a tortuous task.51 If the most respected
rights in criminal cases must "seriously" enhance accuracy 52 or make
accuracy their "major purpose,"" and it is hard to see why we would
require so much, 54 we must try carefully to isolate that aspect of the right
from, or reconcile it with, other values that the right promotes.55 This
sounds hard, and it is; thus the paucity of categorical rules that claim to do
SO.

With an emphasis on the importance of accurate verdicts, the Court
does not deny that all criminal defendants are entitled to fundamental
fairness, 56 but the Court does suggest that the "fundamental" part of
fairness is nearly, if not fully, realized.' Consider, for example, the
validity of a waiver of the rights to silence and to counsel obtained from a
suspect who, after requesting counsel, met with counsel and, following a
fresh set of Mirandawarnings, confessed. 5" Whatever we may think of the

& T. Alexander Alemikoff, DialecticalFederalism:HabeasCorpusand the Court, 86 YALE
L.J. 1035, 1095-97 (1977) (Court's decision to accept guilty plea over defendant's continued

claim of innocence is "an acute embarrassment" to accuracy-based system); Yackle, supra
note 4, at 717-18, 730 ("Where the Court intends to take its new-found interest in petitioners'

possible innocence is far from clear.").
51. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1775-76 n.233 ("Even if the core
constitutional values that underlie Miranda could be identified with precision, it frequently
would be impossible to make tolerably accurate judgments about their implication in
individual cases.').
52. Graham v Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903 (1993).

53. Williams v United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971).
54. See infra notes 174-211 and accompanying text.
55. See Erwin Chemermsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W RES. L.
REv 748,788 (1986-87) ("[R]ight to a speedy trial, protection against unreasonable bail, and
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments
serve values other than accurate
determination of guilt or innocence."); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1774 n.231
(courts are obliged to recognize rights that protect dignitary or other interests unrelated to

accuracy).
56. See Palko v Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
57 See Friedman, supra note 47, at 820-30.
58. See Minnick v Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 148-49 (1990); cf. Solem v Stumes,
465 U.S. 638, 654 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (per se rule later ratified in Minnick "is

not a rule necessary to assure fundamental fairness").
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police in that case, certainly that confession poses a closer call than
confessions obtained by whipping, burning, or torture,59 or capital
convictions of uncounselled, Negro youths.' In fact, the gap between the
conspicuous and fringe violations of fundamental fairness6 may be
responsible in part for the Court's increasing willingness to forgive
constitutional violations committed by "reasonable" government officials.62 Now constables must flout, not just blunder, before error will
lie.63 That, in turn, gives us less to talk about at later stages of review
Federal habeas review of criminal convictions has changed profoundly since the "Utopian "' approach associated with bombshells like Brown
v Allen6 and Fay v Noa,' whose user-friendly habeas has become a

59. See Brown v Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-83 (1936).
60. See Powell v Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49 (1932).
61.

See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOvERNMENT at xix (1983) (noting examples of

official misbehavior). For example, when
[p]olice officers use firearms unnecessarily to apprehend fleeing burglars[,]
[s]uch illegality is usually caused by honest error, simple neglect, excessive
zeal, poor judgment, unconscious bias, legal uncertainty, deficient
execution, and inadequate training or supervision. It tends to be more
routinized and repetitive, more deeply embedded in the standard operating
procedures and adaptations of public office, than the illegality in Monroe v.
Pape or Watergate.
[These practices] may come to be seen as
inseparable from the intractable operating realities ofgovernment, necessary
evils of our public life.
Id., see also Graham v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 892, 915 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(mitigating factors sweep ridiculously far if they encompass "antisocial personality").
62. See Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV 575, 637-38
(1993) (referring to Court's "reasonableness juggernaut"); see also Michigan v Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) ("The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule
assumes
that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has
deprived the defendant of some right.
Where the official action was pursued in
complete good faith,
the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.").
63. See Yale Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" of Criminal Procedure:A
Reply to ProfessorGrano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF 537, 555 (1990).
64. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 50, at 1049-51.
65. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
66. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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cultural artifact. 67 In its place is a pragmatic system of "ad hoc
strictures upon egregious behavior by presumptively legitimate
authority ,,68 "Egregious" refers to those violations which can completely abort
the adversarial process 69 through mob-dominated trials, crooked judges,
and other narrowly defined instances of "inexcusable inequity "70 For
some, like the second Justice Harlan, curtailing the habeas corpus remedy
was a way to "limit the impact of constitutional decisions which seemed
profoundly unsound in principle. "71 For Chief Justice Rehnquist, it
reflects "a presumption of finality and legality [that] attaches to the
conviction and sentence" after trial and appeal, to which the "secondary
and limited" function of habeas is subject. 72
The trend toward narrow readings of rights and remedies simply may
be a product of the Court's hostility toward prisoner suits, which at their
worst are court-clogging forms of recreation for the incarcerated. Almost
all state prisoners lose in the Supreme Court; some are put to death.73 No
one seriously disputes that the heyday of liberty- and rights-based concep-

67 But cf. Herbert Wechsler, Habeas Corpus andthe Supreme Court:Reconsiderng
the Reach of the Great Writ, 59 U. CoLo. L. REv 167, 176 (1988) ("As of today,
the
reach of Brown essentially survives.").
68.

Cover & Alemikoff, supra note 50, at 1050.

69. Brechtv Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993); Lockhartv Fretwell, 113
S. Ct. 838, 842 (1993); Arizona v Fulmmante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1254-55 (1991).
70. Mackey v United States, 401 U.S. 667,701 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part);
see Yale L. Rosenberg, Kaddishfor FederalHabeas Corpus, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv 362,
376 (1991) (recent habeas decisions capture "the popular sentiment that the accused in a
criminal case is entitled to freedom only if he is innocent and has had the hell beaten out of
him").
71. Desist v United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see 3
WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27 4, at 335 n.27 (1984)
(Faymay have contributed to non-retroactivity and harmless error doctrines). ButseeJenkins
v Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 222 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("As one who has never
agreed with the Mirandacase
., I now find myself in the uncomfortable position of having
to dissent from a holding which actually serves to curtail the impact of that decision.").
72. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 887 (1983)).
73. See Wechsler, supra note 67, at 181 ("[O]nly fragmentary data are available
indicates] a rate of
[But] Professor Paul Robinson's [study of] the Seventh Circuit
success somewhat in excess of three percent of all petitions.").
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tions of habeas corpus,74 now considered "profoundly wrong,"75 is over.
76
Under jarringly pessimistic standards, term-by-term the "new habeas
gives full review to fewer and fewer claims. The Court has shut down
federal review of state court transgressions of that "right most valued by
civilized men"' and is quick to bind prisoners to their attorneys' mistakes.7" A majority of the Court apparently thinks that habeas is bad."

Habeas certainly has become a "confused patchwork" 0 of "petty
procedural barriers"'" supported by a "vacuum of rhetoric about federalism"82 designed to privilege rules of preclusion over the "meager benefits"

74. See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
leaves to one side the question whether constitutional
dissenting) ("Today, the Court
rights have been preserved, and considers only petitioner's innocence or guilt."); Fay v
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963) ("manifest policy" to protect "federal constitutional rights
of personal liberty" makes redundancy necessary); Moore v Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87
whether their
(1923) (what matters "is not the petitioners' innocence or guilt but
constitutional rights have been preserved").
75. Withrow v Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1769 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting in
part).
76. See Patchel, supranote 37, at 941-43 (Court's "new habeas" has removed state
criminal justice from federal supervision).
77 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966) (quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)); see supra text accompanying note 40.
78. See Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566-67 (1991) (basic agency
principles apply); Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) ("[A]bsent exceptional circumstances, a defendant is- bound by the tactical decisions of competent counsel.").
79. See Herrera v Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 881 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(majority believes "habeas relief should be denied whenever possible").
80. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1728 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
81. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at2569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Murray v Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 501 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411
U.S. 345, 350 (1973)) (Court's default doctrine threatens to "suffocate the writ in stifling
formalisms or hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of arcane and scholastic procedural
requirements"); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV 840, 874 (1984) (habeas is "a
that preclude[s] adjudication on the merits").
law of closure
82. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2572 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf. Stonev. Powell, 428
U.S. 465,522-23 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[E]ffective utilization of scarcejudicial
carry
resources, finality principles, federal-state friction, and notions of 'federalism'
no more force with respect to non-'guilt-related' constitutional claims than they do with
respect to claims that affect the accuracy of the fact-finding process.").
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of relitigation. Those benefits sometimes accrue "years after trial" when
exclusion or reversal can "strike like lightning" without adequate justification."3 "Obvious[ly] exasperat[ed] with the breadth of substantive federal
habeas doctnne, "I the Court claims to reject "the proposition that
denying relief whenever possible is an unalloyed good"' and even calls,

although with a "resounding hollowness,"86 for "restraint" and "caution"
in this area.8 7

When viewed in light of the generally sagging value of process,
including a renewed forgiveness of ad hoc official illegality, 8 the new
habeas appears to follow naturally Process is playing an increasingly
instrumental, accuracy-oriented role in federal constitutional law;8 9 habeas
is simply playing along. For example, in civil due process cases involving
some nonfundamental liberty and property rights, a plaintiff must show
governmental mens rea 9° and a post-hoc failure to deliver a remedy9
(although no remedy at all can be adequate),' and the plaintiff is not
entitled to presumed damages. 9s If a litigant's participation in potentially
adverse legal processes lacks inherent value,' and remedies for clear-cut

83. See Withrow v Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1760 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting
in part).
84. Coleman v Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2569 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
85. Brecht v Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1732 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
86. Sawyer v Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2529 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
87 Withrow, 113 S.Ct. at 1758 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
88. Cf. Woolhandler, supra note 62, at 644 (habeas reflects scope of other federal
remedies against federal officials, which now treat random ad hoc illegality as second class
form of governmental action, and return systemic wrongs to primacy).
89. Butsee Medina v California, 112 S. Ct. 2572,2577 (1992) (rejecting instrumental,
accuracy-based test of due process in favor of one based on "fundamental fairness").
90. See Daniels v Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986).
91. See Parratt v Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981).
92. See Davidson v Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986).
93. See Carey v Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262-64 (1978).
94. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S.
1, 13-14 (1979) (rejecting formal adversarial parole processes because they undermine
rehabilitation); cf. LAURENCEH. TRIBE, AMERcAN CONSTrrUTioNALLAW

§ 10-7, at 674-77

(2d ed. 1988) ("[I]ndividual participation is most required in
subjective situations
precisely to avoid an individual's feeling that her life and liberty have been dealt serious
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wrongs are regularly dened, 95 then the Court's disdain for federal court
relitigation of state court criminal processes should come as no surprise.
Then again, civil procedural due process rights may be more
susceptible to an instrumentalist analysis than are criminal cases, where the
concern is with substantive, conscience-shocking 96 state action. Civil
litigants may not deserve the higher order entitlements that criminal
defendants get, given both the fundamental nature of the defendant's liberty
or life interest and the fact that even the fairest predeprivation hearing
could not authorize the government conduct in question. 97 But most of
these higher order process rights are themselves derivative of selective
incorporation cases, whose conception of fundamental fairness has little to
recommend them. 9 Thus, while a crimnal defendant's claim to trial or
appellate process for process's sake may be stronger than that of a prisoner
who sues over a $23.50 lost hobby kit, 99 even criminal due process

enjoins only government action that offends "hardened sensibilities.""
Cutbacks on the process due in criminal and prisoner cases no doubt
have insulated more governmental conduct from challenge. And not all of
those changes have been articulated or defended adequately Specifically,

affliction without reason or explanation.").
95. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1784-85 (officer and governmental immunity
"depart decisively from the notion that the Constitution requires effective remedies for all
victims of constitutional violations").
96. See Rochin v California, 342 U.S. 165, 166-67 (1952) (nonconsensual stomachpumping of victim of police-orchestrated burglary).
97 Cf. Larry Alexander, ConstitutionalTorts, the Supreme Court, and the Law of
Noncontradiction:An Essay on Zinermon v. Burch, 87 Nw U. L. REV 576, 588 (1993)
(substantive due process "forbids government to deprive persons of life, liberty, and
property for certain reasons that the clause deems inadequate-either because those reasons
are not sufficiently compelling given the interest at stake, or because they are illegitimate
or not reasons at all").
98. See Dripps, supranote 44, at 601 (refermng to doctrine of selective incorporation
as "intellectual landfill").
99 See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 529 (1981). The criminal and prisoner
cases are more similar than we often admit. See Alexander, supra note 97, at 588-89
(courts mischaractenze claims as procedural due process when there is "no claim by the
plaintiffs that their losses would have been justified had only they been preceded by a
hearing"); Woolhandler, supra note 62, at 642 nn.392-95.
100. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
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the Court's strong preference for individualized rather than categorical
standards of review makes little sense in light of the function of appellate
and habeas review. Moreover, even when the Court does resort to
categorical standards, the standards are either too stingy or too permissive
to reflect a principled system of rights-ordering.
II. Withrow v Williams: Accuracy and Other Values
Withrow v Williams"0 illustrates an overly permissive approach to
a categorical, as opposed to an individualized, system of rights-ordering.
Withrow addresses the Miranda rights, which require police to obtain a
suspect's permission before interrogating her while she is in custody lest
her statements be deemed inadmissible at trial.102 In Withrow, a 5-4
Court declined to "Stone" Miranda;that is, the Court refused to deny relief
to any habeas petitioner who had a chance to litigate her Mirandaclaim in
state court. 10 3 Along the way, the Court emphasized Miranda'scontribution to accurate verdicts and the wide range of dignitary norms that
Miranda protects. 104 Withrow is a clear and high example of why a
categorical approach to rights-ordering on federal habeas corpus is
exceedingly difficult.
Stone is Stone v Powell,"05 which gave state courts the last word
on federal search and seizure law 106 Authored by Justice Powell, Stone
betrayed a profound distrust for the exclusionary rule and federal review
of state proceedings. When asked several times after Stone to extend
Stone's reasoning to rights healthier than the Fourth Amendment exclusion-

101. 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993).
102. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-70 (1966).
103. Withrow v Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1750-51 (1993). The Court had reserved
the question twice before in Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 201 n.3 (1989), and in
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n.l1 (1977).
104. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1751-55.
105. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
106. Anyone who was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate her Fourth
Amendment claim in the state courts is barred from obtaining federal habeas relief. Stone
v Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
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ary rule,"0 7 the Court refused to make state court rulings res judicata,
even on matters unrelated to substantive guilt.'0 8
Stone depends entirely on the Court's still-unsubstantiated claim that

review of a criminal trial-that "decisive and portentous event '' 0 diminishes severely and steadily in value after judgment." 0 If "significant institutional problems""' prevent federal courts from acting like
postconviction triers of fact," 2 the argument runs, little is gained by
asking those courts to relitigate more claims (some of them unpreserved for
review), or to backdate more new rules, just to get to the merits of disputes
they cannot competently decide. Under an accuracy-centered view of
habeas, therefore, a habeas court's primary mission exploits its greatest
weakness: deciding out of context what a defendant really did." 3

107 See Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 371 (1986) (effective assistance of
counsel); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1979) (review of sufficiency of evidence).
108. See Rose v Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 549 (1979) (discrimination in selection of
nonvoting grand jury foreperson).
109. Wainwright v Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) ("[S]tate trial on the merits is the
'main event,'
rather than a 'tryout on the road' for what will later be the determinative
federal habeas hearing."); see Engle v Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982) ("Liberal
allowance of the writ
degrades the prominence of the trial
").
110. Stone, 428 U.S. at 493.
111. Kuhlmann v Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 471 n.7 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. See Cover & Alemikoff, supra note 50, at 1052 ("The guilt, innocence, or
dangerousness of the defendant can rarely be the object of focused inquiry in federal
court."); Friedman, supra note 7, at 320-21 ("One of the best supported and least
controverted principles of habeas is that it is not to serve as a retrial of the prisoner."); id.
at 321 (citing Stacy & Dayton, supra note 43, at 93-94) (appellate courts are being asked
to "resolve questions of actual innocence or prejudice, a task to which they are ill-suited");
Patchel, supranote 37, at 971 ("[H]ow does a federal district court on habeas, let alone the
Supreme Court on certiorari review, determine the factual innocence of a petitioner who
has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by ajury of her peers?"); see also Barbara
A. Babcock, Introduction:Taking the Stand, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV 1, 10-11 (1993)
("The idea of the trial as a one-time event, defying accurate reconstruction, is not
unfamiliar to a Court which has reshaped federal habeas corpus in that image.").
113. Cf. Ann Althouse, Saying What Rights Are-In and Out of Context, 1991 Wis.
L. REv 929, 939 ("If context is good, state judges have more of it. On the other hand, if
rights are good, perhaps context is dangerous.").
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Together, the primacy of accuracy and institutional incompetency support
any argument in favor of limiting habeas review 114
Nonetheless, Withrow illustrates that Stone's limit on review will not
extend beyond the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. In Withrow,
Robert Allen Williams, Jr. was arrested and questioned three times while
in custody during an investigation of a double murder in Romulus, Michigan.
Only the first session's un-Mirandized statements were admitted
in Williams's bench trial.Y6 Williams was convicted, and his appeal was
unsuccessful. 7 After a federal district judge granted Williams relief on
habeas, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the
Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the State's argument that the Michigan
114. The purported weaknesses of habeas corpus go beyond its deficiency as a vehicle
for redetermining substantive guilt. Epistemological skeptics reject any error-correction
value of the review of criminal convictions. See Seidman, supra note 2, at 458 (citing
Bator, supra note 12, at 463-99). But cf. Barclay v Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 988 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("If appellate review is to be meaningful, it must fulfill its basic
historic function of correcting error in the trial court proceedings."). Yet skeptics ignore
that the value of investing in knowing what may be unknowable also is unknowable. That
added uncertainty should tip the scale in favor of review once we account for the
aspirational value of review, which is knowable. Thus, I agree that Justice Powell's
marriage of the familiar work of Professor Paul Bator, see generally Bator, supra note 12
(doubting error-correction value of review), with that of Judge Henry Friendly, see
generally Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CFI. L. REv 142 (1970) (reserving review for substantive innocence),
was a mismatch. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-87 (1976) (doubting errorcorrection value of review except for claims that go to substantive innocence); see also
Patchel, supra note 37, at 970 ("[T]he innocence standard denigrates the importance of
process by suggesting that, although a prisoner has been found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt after a process that the Court considers adequate, the prisoner still can prove her
innocence."); Seidman, supra note 2, at 456-59 ("[W]hereas Judge Friendly wishes to limit
habeas to questions of ultimate fact, Professor Bator wishes to limit habeas because
questions of ultimate fact are ultimately unanswerable."). Particularly, it is Bator's
exaggerated skepticism about the value of review of legal or so-called "mixed" questions,
not Friendly's concern solely for the substantively innocent, that doomed Powell's crusade
to give states the final word on more constitutional questions. See Seidman, supra note 2,
at 459 n.133; cf. Yackle, supra note 4, at 713-14 (the only way to test error-correction
value of federal habeas is "to observe the state courts operating without the federal district
courts waiting in the wings").
115. Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1748-49 (1993).
116. Id. at 1749.
117 Id.
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courts' rulings on Williams's Mirandaclaim should preclude their reconsideration in a federal habeas court.I"
Justice Souter's majority opinion retained federal review in part
because Miranda,while overbroad and prophylactic, protects a "fundamental trial right" ' 9 connected at some level to "the correct ascertainment of
guilt. "120 Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, objected
to every line of Souter's opinion, except Souter's description of Miranda
as "prophylactic." Unlike the Fifth Amendment that it protects, she
observed, Mirandaexcludes some truly voluntary statements, so Miranda
must be something less than a fundamental trial right. 121 Consequently,
as with the exclusion of reliable evidence at issue in Stone, Mirandais "at
war," potentially "intolerabl[y]," with "the quest for truth.""
As is customary, both sides cited "deterrence" for contrary propositions. Each recognized law enforcement's general compliance with
Miranda, but disagreed over whether federal review was (Justice Souter)
or was not (Justice O'Connor) necessary to maintain compliance. Given
that deterrence, without more, is no more a reason to grant or deny relief
than are federalism, finality, and friction (I have yet to hear of a constitutional violation that we do not want to deter), these were appropriately the
least spirited and least important portions of Souter's and O'Connor's
opinions.
Finally and "most importantly," even if Mirandaclaims were barred
from the front door of habeas review because most involve involuntary
statements, Justice Souter was convinced that these claims "would simply
be recast" as due process claims and thus would sneak in the back doors of
federal courthouses and bring with them inquiries more subjective and
cumbersome than Miranda's.11 Justice O'Connor rejected this "pragmatic" assessment of Mirandaclaims. 24 O'Connor found voluntary-but-

118. Id.
119
(1990)).

Id. at 1753 (quoting United States v Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264

120.

Id.

121.

Id. at 1760-62 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).

122.

Id. at 1762 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).

123.

Id. at 1754.

124.

Id. at 1762 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
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improperly-taken confessions far less unusual and the question of voluntariness much easier to adjudicate than did Souter, who in her view overlooked
2
that Miranda "creates as many close questions as it resolves. " 5
Justices Souter and O'Connor had much more to say about Miranda
than they did about Stone. Not so with Justice Scalia who, joined by
Justice Thomas, dissented. Scalia, who thinks Stone was a great idea, said
that it was time that Stone reached not only Miranda, but other claims not
crucial to the fairness or accuracy of the trial. 26 On these grounds,2
27
Scalia explained past refusals to extend Stone: ineffective counsel' 8
and discriminatorily selected grand jures129 are unfair, and anything
short of demanding appellate review of the factual sufficiency of a verdict
risks the accuracy of that verdict.13 For unstated reasons, Scalia saw
Miranda as too remote from fairness or accuracy to warrant similar
treatment absent "unusual equitable factors" showing the defendant's
substantive innocence. 3 '
As is typical of Miranda cases, the Justices could not avoid
addressing Miranda'sstatus as a lowly prophylactic rule. Also typical is
the Justices' disagreement about the legal consequences of that label. In
Withrow, the labeling was ultimately dicta. 3 2 Whatever meaning "prophylactic" had for the Withrow majority was overwhelmed by Miranda's
status as a personal, accuracy-enhancing trial right.'33 But, despite the
rhetoric, whether Justice Souter successfully proved that Mirandabelongs
above the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in the Court's hierarchy of
rights is a much closer question than the three Withrow opinions recognize.
125. Id. at 1764 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part) (citing Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S.
436,544-45 (1966) (White, J., dissenting)). Indeed, Justice O'Connor noted that the Miranda

doctrine has retained much of the contextual nature of the voluntariness doctrine. Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
126. Id. at 1767-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
127

Id. at 1768 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).

128. See Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 371 (1986).
129. See Rose v Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 549 (1979).

130. See Jackson v Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1979).
131.

Withrow, 113 S.Ct. at 1767-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

132. See also Duckworth v Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203, 209 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Oregon v Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
133.

Withrow, 113 S.Ct. at 1753.
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Conservatives believe a prophylactic rule is one that can be violated
without a violation of the Constitution and, therefore, has no force in state
criminal cases.1 4 To the extent that Mirandastrikes at potentially (rather
than actually) compelled statements, they say, it is broader than the
constitutional text. 35 Thus, Miranda's self-described "prophylactic
standards" cannot legitimately dictate exclusion where the defendant's
statements are not "involuntary in traditional terms."' 36 Liberals, on the
other hand, describe prophylactic rules as handy tools that compensate for
courts' incompetency in unraveling highly factualized problems: in this
case, secret encounters. 3 7 The conservative approach has prevailed in
limiting Miranda as a basis for exclusion by attacking its overbreadth. 3
For conservatives, Mirandamakes a perfect candidate for issue preclusion
because alternatives to the warning-waiver catechism may be constitutionally adequate.' 39
Indeed, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule at issue in Stone,
although a judge-made remedy (which is bad), is not a judge-made
prophylactic rule (which is worse) even though it frequently has been
referred to as such.' " The exclusionary rule applies "only after an actual
constitutional violation occurs"'14 1 and thus is not overly broad. This
important distinction would seem to privilege Mapp v Ohio's42 Fourth

134. See Joseph D. Grano, ProphylacticRules in CriminalProcedure:A Question of
Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REv 100, 105 (1985).

135. See U.S. CONST. amend. V
136. Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
137 See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE552-54 (7th ed. 1990)
(quoting David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity ofProphylacticRules,55 U. CHI. L. REv 190, 19495, 208-09 (1988)).
138. E.g., Oregon v Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985).
139. See Alfred Hill, The Bill ofRights and the Supervisory Power,69 COLUM. L. REV
181, 182-93 (1969) (state and federal differences on meaning of fundamental fairness do not
water down constitutional rights if alternatives are adequate).
140. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,329 n.2 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Rawlings
v Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110 (1980); Stone v Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 479 (1976) (quoting
Kaufman v United States, 394 U.S. 217, 224 (1969)); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 408 n.8 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
141.

Grano, supranote 134, at 103-04.

142.

367 U.S. 643 (1961).

RIGHTS-ORDERING ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS

689

Amendment exclusionary remedy over Miranda's, but Withrow did quite
the opposite. In Withrow, Justice Souter mentioned Miranda'sstatus as a
"fundamental trial right," 43 but Souter offered not a word as to why
Mirandais suddenly respected as such on habeas, while illegally obtained
statements pass through Mirandalike a sieve at suppression hearings.
As a personal trial right, Miranda, for Justice Souter, is more
important than out-of-the-courthouse rights, such as the guarantee against
unreasonable quests for evidence, 144 or in-court rights raised at later
stages of review, such as those based on counsel's performance on federal
habeas. 45 A Miranda violation occurs not when the incriminating
speech-act first occurs, but when it is admitted at trial on the issue of
guilt. 4 Mapp, by contrast, protects the citizen only at the situs of the
officials' invasion. A trial judge's admission of evidence that police
obtained by an illegal search and seizure is said to perform no new wrong,
but the need to deter future unlawful police misconduct
makes reversal
47
proper for purely utilitarian, not personal, reasons.'
Justice Souter's defense of Miranda as a personal trial right,
however, while rejecting the notion that Miranda, too, is primarily
concerned with deterring police, refers repeatedly to the need to do just
that. In so doing, Souter borrowed a variety of soft variables from a preMirandaopinion by Justice Goldberg, which perseverated over out-of-court

143. Withrow v Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1753 (1993) (quoting United States v
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)).

144. See Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986) ("[IThe Fourth
Amendment is not a trial right; the protection it affords against governmental intrusion into
one's home and affairs pertains to all citizens.").
145. See Wainwright v Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (no right to effective
counsel where no right to counsel).
146. Accordingly, no civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lies against police who flout
Miranda. See generally Cooper v Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992). Although
Mirandaobsessed over police practices, ultimately it is pitched at trial courts, not police. See
Johnson v New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719,730 (1966) (Mirandaapplies to persons whose trials,

not confessions, were completed before Court's decision in Miranda).
147 See Elkins v United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) ("The [exclusionary] rule
is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it.").
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police behavior.148 Consequently, Miranda's strengths-a personal trial
right with a built-in exclusionary remedy-and weaknesses-its status as
judge-made prophylaxis 49 and susceptibility to a deterrence-of-police

rather than trial-right foundation"'S-leave unresolved whether it should
be cogmzable on habeas. Certainly, Mirandaviolations can be less odious
to judicial integrity than incompetent defense attorneys' 5 ' and discrminatory grand jury processes." And given that a trial judge's error on a
dignity-based right does not necessarily compromise judicial integrity,' 53
it must be Miranda's deeper concern for the "innocent man" who
challenges "the basic justice of his incarceration" that better explains why
there, but not for truth-impairing Fourth
federal review is appropriate
54
claims.1
Amendment

148. Withrow v Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1753 (1993) (quoting Murphy v
Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)) (privilege promotes, inter alia,
adversarialness, dignity, fair play, and privacy).
149 But cf. Kamisar,supranote 63, at 546-47 (due process requirement that involuntary
confession be suppressed at trial also is judge-made rule).
150. See Michigan v Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (Miranda'spurpose was to
deter); Fallon & Meltzer, supranote 34, at 1810-11 (citing Friendly, supranote 114, at 163)
(same).
151. See Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 376-77 (1986) (while Stone "sought
protection of his
merely to avail himself of the exclusionary rule, Morrison seeks
personal right to effective assistance of counsel"); id. at 380 ("[W]e have never intimated that
the right to counsel is conditioned upon actual innocence."). Compare Friedman, supra note
7, at281-82 (Kimmelnan defensible on guilt/innocence grounds) with Jeffries & Stuntz, supra
note 42, at 686-91, 712-13 (Kimmelman should be reversed for its non-guilt-relatedness).
152. See Rose v Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555-56, 561-63 (1979); id. at 587 n.10
(Powell, J., concurring) ("[Ir]he right not to be indicted by a discriminatorily selected grand
evidence introduced at trial, has
jury, like the right not to have improperly obtained
nothing to do with the guilt or innocence of the petitioner.").
153. See United States v Johnson, 457 U.S. 537,564-65 (1982) (White, J., dissenting)
(exclusionary rule preserves judicial integrity, which is not offended by trial judge's
admission of evidence that police obtained in good-faith but still unconstitutional search and
seizure); United States v Payner, 447 U.S. 727,736 n.8 (1980) (judicial integrity gives way
to law of standing); cf. Arenella, supranote 3, at 203 ("ITihe 'judicial integrity' label is
misleading because the issue is not whether the courts are 'condoning' improper executive
action or whether they are 'vicariously responsible' for the executive's misconduct. The issue
is not the court's integrity but the criminal process' integrity as a self-regulating legal
order.").
154. Stone v Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976).
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Miranda's concern for innocence, however, is not all that deep.

55

Its categorical, per se rule was designed to avoid questions about the

reliability of confessions. But both Justice Souter and Justice O'Connor
treated the reliability aspect of Miranda as important. In fact, both cited
Johnson v New Jersey 56 to support opposite conclusions about whether

Miranda cares about untrustworthy confessions. 57 Yet what matters is
not whether Mirandahas a reliability component, but whether it needs one.
The forces of self-interest may make most confessions true, 5 8 but
Mirandawas more about dignity, privacy, and a preference for enlightened
investigative techniques 59 than about correcting perversions of the truthfinding mission."6° Souter's opinion, therefore, dusts off some respect
both for rights that only marginally enhance the accuracy of a verdict and
for a complex of soft variables unrelated to accuracy
That was not Justice Souter's stated purpose, however. Instead,
Souter said efficiency is the primary reason for preserving federal court
review of Mirandaclaims. 6 ' To Stone Mirandawould, in Souter's view,

155. See Withrow v Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1753 (1993) ("Nor does the Fifth
Amendment 'trial right' protected by Mirandaserve some value necessarilydivorced from
the correct ascertainment of guilt.") (emphasis added); see also Teague v Lane, 489 U.S.
288,335 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Tehan v Shott, 382 U.S. 406,416 (1966))
("[The] privilege against self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth.");
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1775 n.233 ("[Miranda's]relationship to accurate factfinding is indirect and often insubstantial.").
156. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
157 Withrow, 113 S.Ct. at 1753; id. at 1759 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
158. See Charles T. McCormick, Some ProblemsandDevelopments in the Admissibility
of Confessions, 24 TFX.L. REV 239, 241 (1946).
159. See Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966); Daniel B. Yeager, Search,
Seizure and the PositiveLaw: Expectationsof Privacy Outside the FourthAmendment, 84 J.
CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249, 266 n.92 (1993).

160. See Smith v Murray, 477 U.S. 527,544 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Miany
protections
are not only irrelevant [to accuracy], but possibly counterproductive"
too, such as self-incrimination.); Engle v Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 149 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[E]vidence procured in violation of [Mapp or Miranda]has not ordinarily been
rendered untrustworthy by the means of its procurement.").
161. Cf. Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,380-82 (1986) (Stricklandtest, which
gives prisoners burden of proving ineffectiveness of counsel, is sufficient incentive for
rational attorneys to pursue search-and-seizure claims in state court); Jackson v Virginia, 443
U.S. 307,322 (1979) (while "[a] more stringent standard will expand the contours of this type
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discourage few confessors from filing habeas petitions; most would simply
recast their confessions as coerced or involuntary and thus governed by the
Due Process Clauses. 62
Justice Souter did not suggest that Mirandaand due process claims
are coterminous; clearly they are not, even though in recent confessions
cases the Court has tolerated "subtle compulsion"' 63 and insisted on
"compelling influences"" and a suspect's objective experience of
"coercion" 65 before Miranda attaches. The Court's recent decisions,
therefore, may have brought the two standards closer together by abandoning an irrebuttable presumption of compulsion in favor of a search for
compulsion in fact." 6 But, other than to make Miranda's prophylactic
label less descriptive,1 67 this convergence is nowhere near complete.
Noncompliance with Mirandaremains neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition of a due process violation, which requires a showing of more
police overreaching than does Miranda.
None of this likely was lost on Justice Souter. His fear was that
whatever gain to federalism there would be from denying relief to Miranda
claimants forced to fit their claims into the more exacting due process
standard would be lost by the extra burden on habeas courts from the
comparatively complicated claims Stoned Mirandaprisoners would be sure
to file. 168 Despite Souter's contention, however, filing a claim and
prevailing under it are two entirely different matters. Prior to concerning
of claim," they would not be "an entirely new class of cases," and would not necessitate
federal evidentiary hearings because basis of claim is right on record).
162. See Withrow v Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1754 (1993).
163.

Rhode Island v Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980).

164.

Arizona v Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529 (1987).

165.

Illinois v Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990).

166. See Daniel Yeager, Rethinking CustodialInterrogation,28 AM. CRIM. L. REV 1,
41, 69-70 (1990); see also Colorado v Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (schizophrenic's
waiver valid absent police misconduct); Oregon v Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985)
(warnings and waiver can cleanse prior Mirandablunder).
167 While individualizing and therefore weakening Miranda's categorical rule should
please conservatives because Miranda is taken away from more suspects, weakened as well
is the claim that Miranda is unconcerned with the Fifth Amendment's textual ban on
compelled self-incrimination. As the right weakens, police must do more to violate it, which
should strengthen Miranda'sclaim to the status of pure constitutional right.
168.

Withrow v Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1754 (1993).
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itself with whether Mirandaclaimants would return in due process garb if
barred from federal habeas, the Withrow Court should have addressed
whether Mirandabelongs in federal court in the first place. To best answer
that, we should imagine a habeas not only absent Miranda, but also
unreceptive to due process claims. Only then can we isolate whether
Mirandaclaimants deserve federal relief; if they do not, then Stoning them
certainly would be efficient.
Justice Souter's efficiency rationale leapfrogged the issue of whether
Miranda belongs in federal court at all and instead assessed how many
prisoners would recast their claims as something they are not. A host of
prisoners whose wills were not overborne but who were interrogated in
violation of Mirandano doubt would love to get new trials, even if the new
trial means missing out on the Due Process Clause's greater evidentiary
protections. 69 In short, a claim's cognizability has nothing to do with
whether it might be translated into the language of another amendment, but
instead turns on whether federal court is an appropriate forum in the first
instance.
Recast or not, neither sort of confessions claim seeks primarily to
ensure the admissibility of trustworthy evidence. 170 Absent Justice
Souter's spurious efficiency theory, what are we to make of the Court's
retaimng habeas review for an entire class of claims only barely concerned
with the so-called truth-seeking mission of habeas? If efficiency really
were the test, then Justice Scalia's individualized approach, which would
preserve review only for the Miranda claim accompaned by "unusual
equitable factors" such as a showing of substantive innocence, should have
prevailed.'
But Scalia's view is not the law Because Miranda is not

169. See Harris v New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1971) (holding that voluntary
statement taken in violation of Miranda may be used by State on cross-examination to
impeach credibility of defendant's testimony).
170. See Kamisar, supra note 63, at 543-44 & n.27 (quoting Rogers v Richmond, 365
U.S. 534, 543-44 (1961)) ("[A]dmissibility of an involuntary confession must be determined
'with complete disregard of whether or not petitioner in fact spoke the truth.'"). Indeed, even
the early confessions cases "adumbrate an enlarged test of due process transcending the
simple one of untrustworthiness." Roger J.Traynor, The Devils of Due Processin Criminal
Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. Rav 657, 665 (1966). But cf.Mishkin,

supra note 8, at 83-86 (concern for unreliability of coerced confessions not "entirely
abandoned").
171.

See supranotes 126-31 and accompanying text.
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really about accuracy, the best explanation for Withrow is that Miranda's
scant contribution to accuracy, i1 2 its various dignitary values, or both,
make Mirandatoo important to leave to state court processes.
The compliment that Withrow paid to soft, dignity norms was too
muted, by itself, to give those process ideals much currency elsewhere.

Indeed, the vindication of soft variables was more likely a result rather than
a purpose of Withrow Nonetheless, Withrow shows that habeas is not
dedicated solely to vindicating the substantively innocent or unlawfully
sentenced. 73 By pitching its ruling at a class of claims and thereby
avoiding questions of Withrow's innocence vel non, the Court deviated not
only from its trend toward individualized standards of review, but also from
a history of trivializing categorical approaches through crude and unsubstan-

tiated classifications of rights. Ultimately, however, Withrow's virtue (its
Brown v Allen-esque open-door policy) may also be the vice (an unwillingness to attach legal consequences to differences among rights) that stifles
rather than sparks a thoughtful approach to rights-ordering in crimnal cases.

172. If, as Withrow suggests in part, the beleaguered Miranda can be justified by
reference to accuracy, then so could any claim "not necessarily divorced from the correct
ascertainment of guilt." Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1753. As a result, any categorical rule that
would exempt from preclusion or forfeit claims only tenuously related to accuracy would be
far too capacious to trim habeas in the name of accuracy; it would trim nothing. Even Justice
Brennan, who favored categorical exemptions from raise-or-waive rules for claims with
sufficient guilt-relatedness, apparently was willing to sacrifice full review of some
nonqualifying claims. See Wainwright v Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 110 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). CompareTeague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 335-37 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(listing array of claims unrelated to accuracy and denying existence of accuracy-first theory
of habeas review) and Stone v Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 517-18 & n.13 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (fixation on guilt would bar door to more than Fourth Amendment) with Engle v
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 149 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Kaufman v United States,
394 U.S. 217, 237 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting)) ("A defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
may arguably be characterized as 'crucially different from
or his Miranda rights
in that evidence procured in violation of those rights has
many other constitutional rights'
not ordinarily been rendered untrustworthy by the means of its procurement."). For this
reason, Withrow, ostensibly a victory for one of the Warren Court's highest profile
precedents, also explains the same day's counterweight-the exceedingly forgiving standard
for assessing the influence of constitutional error announced in Brecht v Abrahamson, 113
S. Ct. 1710 (1993). See infra notes 317-38 and accompanying text; see also supra note 71
and accompanying text (quoting Desist v United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (remedial curtailment checks constitutional decisions which go too far)).
173.

See Smith v Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986).
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IlL CategoricalVersus Individualized Guilt
The failure. to develop a more refined perspective of rights-ordering
based on a right's contribution to ensuring accurate verdicts has not resulted
from lack of opportunity An early attempt at rights-ordering based on a
claim's guilt-relatedness appeared in the Court's retroactivity cases, in which
soft variables played no role. The 1960's LinkletterlStovall74 balancing
test retroactively applied all new, accuracy-enhancing rules unless doing so
would undermine the government's good-faith reliance on the old rule or
would swing open the jailhouse doors too widely 175 Although not known

for its complicity in the Court's heave-ho-to-digmty movement, the Warren
Court, through its retroactivity doctrine, made a big deal of accuracy, but

did little to back up its pronouncements that a given right was or was not
accuracy-enhancing enough to backdate.176
Under the LmkletterlStovall test, as designed by the Warren Court and
embellished by the Burger Court, accuracy-enhancement was a "matter of
degree, " " of "probabilities,"178 dependent on a right's "peculiar
traits,"' 179 and by no means an "inflexible"1" or "ironclad" doctnne., "

Its built-in flexibility may sound value-neutral, but once animated, it took on
a value-laden, rights-crabbing style. As always, so-called "jurisdictional"2
challenges to the trial court's authority received special treatment.'

174. Stovall v Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Linkletter v Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965).
175. Cf. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 714 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(citing Tehan v Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 419 (1966)) (accuracy-enhancing rules apply
prospectively "when the majority thinks that the impact of the new rule
would be
'devastating'").
176. C. id. at 695 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part) ("I find inherently intractable the
purported distinction between those rules that are designed to improve the factfinding process
and those designed principally to further other values."); Haddad, supra note 41, at 434
(Court's use of accuracy prong of LmkletterlStovall tends to "ignore its own articulated
rationale for a particular decision").
177 Johnson v New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966).
178. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 674.
179. Johnson, 384 U.S. at 728.
180. Williams v United States, 401 U.S. 646, 651 (1971).
181. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 509 (1973).
182. See Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 59 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Robinson, 409 U.S. at 509; John B. Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme CourtDoctrine
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Beyond those, though, retroactivity was reserved for the "sine qua non of
accura[cyl""' 3-rules whose "major"" or "central" 5 purpose
was to "correct serious flaws"' 86 that had a "fundamental impact"', on
88 "serious risk,"18 9
fact-finding by creating a "substantial likelihood,"'
or "significant chance"19° that "innocent [persons] had been wrongfully
punished in the past. "19'
However, it was "quite different where the purpose of the new
unreliable
[was] not to minimize or avoid
constitutional standard
as
recognition
other
ends,
such
results but to serve other ends. "" Those
of counsel's role in helping her client gain pretrial release or dismissal
altogether, 9 3 the avoidance of "arbitrariness and repression, '"194 judicial
vindictiveness," discrimination,'" or low public confidence in the
Some
administration of justice," 7 the Court would "lay aside."'9
rights, arguably the most important ones, involve a "complex of values '' 99 and could not be reduced to a "single and distinct 'purpose.' "20

"As Applied, " 61 N.C. L. REv 745, 755-56 (1983).
183. Solem v Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 644 (1984).
184. Williams, 401 U.S. at 653.
185. Payne, 412 U.S. at 61-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
186. Stovall v Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967).
187 Allen v Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986).
188. Williams v United States, 401 U.S. 646, 655 n.7 (1971).
189. Roberts v Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 295 (1968).
190. United States v United States Corn & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 724 (1971).
191. Id.
192. Williams, 401 U.S. at 653.
193. See Adams v Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 281-82 (1972) (plurality opinion).
194. DeStefano v Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 (1968); Bloom v Illinois, 391 U.S. 194,
202 (1968).
195. See Michigan v Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 50 (1973).
196. See Allen v Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 256 (1986).
197 Id. at 259.
198. Adams v Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 281 (1972) (plurality opinion).
199. Tehan v Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414 (1966).
200. Id. at 413-14.
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Sadly then, a right that encompassed the broadest range of values, but
raised no more than "marginal doubts"2"' about the guilt of defendants
convicted in prior trials, 2' had only a weak claim to retroactivity
The trick to obtaining retroactive application of a new rule, it
seemed, was for the prisoner to convince the Court that the issue of
accuracy was more than marginal. 0 3 But when victims of condemned
practices such as uncounselled identifications 2N and interrogations, 0 5
unwelcomed bench trials in serious cases, 2° and potentially retaliatory
sentencing practces2 w satisfied this condition, they were nonetheless
denied retroactive benefit because either: 1)those practices sometimes yield
reliable results;20 ' 2) an alternative constitutional guarantee would
vindicate their claim;'i or 3) other, similar rights already had been
denied retroactive application. 210 Even the Court's liberal number
tolerated this problematic aspect of the Court's retroactivity decisions. 2 "
Without discussing LmkletterlStovall's uninspired accuracy-first
dialogue, which at the time was in full swing, Professors Robert Cover and
Alexander Alemikoff in 1977 offered a hopeful account of the possibilities

201. Hankerson v North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 243 (1977); Gosa v Mayden, 413
U.S. 665, 680 (1973) (plurality opinion); Mackey v United States, 401 U.S. 667, 674-75
(1971); Johnson v New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729-30 (1966); Tehan, 382 U.S. at 415.
202. Williams v United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971).
203. See Haddad, supra note 41, at 433 ("[Lnkletter] drew a distinction between those
rights which go to the very integrity of the fact-finding process and those which have nothing
to do with the reliability of the adjudication of guilt, but it did not pause to consider rights
whose purpose fell somewhere in between.").
204.

See Stovall v Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 295 (1967).

205. See Solem v Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 639-41 (1984); Johnson v New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719, 721 (1966).
206. See DeStefano v Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 632 (1968); Bloom v Illinois, 391 U.S.
194, 195 (1968).
207

Michigan v Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973).

208.

See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 298.

209.

See Adams v Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 282 (1972) (plurality opinion).

210. E.g., DeStefano, 392 U.S. at 633 (denying retroactive effect to Duncan v
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)).
211. But cf. Allen v Hardy, 478 U.S. 255,261 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Payne,
412 U.S. at 59 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Adams, 405 U.S. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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for accuracy-based review 22 After noticing that recent habeas rulings
had begun to change the Court's prior neutral, trans-substantive view of
process by elevating the importance of accurate verdicts, 1 3 the authors
concluded that the change could be good.214

They were hard on the

Court's sense of combative individualism, which bound prisoners to their
attorneys' errors through an unforgiving notion of waiver, 2 5 but optimistic about the "substantive integrity ' 21 6 of the new accuracy-based habeas.2 7 Concededly, the new approach would establish a substantive and
remedial hierarchy of constitutional rights, but they predicted that the
hierarchy will channel the cascade of prisoner petitions m new
directions [and] articulate innocence-relevant claims m old and
new ways. This channel will deepen as state and lower federal
courts consider such claims and rule on novel innocencerelevant rights rather than upon rights which are older, more
established, but2 8less closely related to these hierarcically
superior values.

212. See Cover & Alemikoff, supra note 50, at 1047-49. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963), they wrote, unconsciously advanced a dialectic between state and federal courts in
which "two distinct voices" engage in a lively dialogue on "notions of fundamental
fairness" until the Supreme Court, drawing on the teachings of the dialogue, resolves it.
Cover & Alemikoff, supranote 50, at 1047-49. Redundancy of process need not be based
on equality of justice. It could just as easily be directed by another value, like innocence,
and still retain its potential for creating new rights and expanding categories of collateral

relief. Id. at 1067
213. See Patchel, supra note 37, at 964-65, 1052 ("Th[e] denial of the transsubstantive nature of habeas review in favor of tests based on the nature of the constitutional claim
has had serious consequences for the concept of neutrality of procedure.").
214. Cover & Alemikoff, supra note 50, at 1077-78, 1086.
215. See id. at 1072-85 (discussing, inter alia, Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501
(1976), which held that prisoner tried and convicted in his prison garb violated due process,
but failure to object at trial constituted waiver, even though prisoner had objected earlier
to his jailer).
216. Id. at 1086.
217 See id. at 1096 (guilt-innocence theory "is as rich, as vague, as promising, and
as problematic as equality").

218. Id. at 1087
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Eventually, if not already, they concluded, an emphasis on accuracy not only
would form remedial contours, but would become "the principal doctrine for

restricting existing rights and creating new ones.219
Cover and Alemikoff were willing to live with the injury this approach
could do to the "symbolic" and "evocative" qualities of truth-obstructing
rights like Mapp and Miranda.' For truth-neutral rights (like speedy trial
and collateral estoppel) and "cherished ideals" (like bans on grand jury

discrimination), they cautioned against an overzealous search for accuracy,
which could become a "mockery-a euphemistic dressing for inaction"',
and result in a "drastic impoverishment of the language of rights."I They

then rightly anticipated the constitutionalization of burdens, presumptions,
and the sufficiency of evidence, but understated the Court's commitment to
indictments by fairly selected grand juries.
Cover and Alemikoff were correct that the emphasis on accurate
verdicts would become a basis of substantive-rights articulation, and

unfortunately, the Court has ignored their admonition against overzealousness. 2 Despite the potentially bright future that Cover and Alemikoff saw
for an accuracy-first theory of review, its development in the Court has been
disappointing, whether directed at retroactivity, the raise-or-waive doctrine

known as "procedural default," or the Court's harmless error rule, which
permits appellate courts to overlook some trial-level defects of constitutional
magnitude.
In the retroactivity context, Linkletter/Stovall and its "myriad

verbalisms"' 2 was a "perfectly good rule" for Justice White,'
proved too "simplistic" for Justice Blackmun?

but

and a demeaning "morass"

219. Id., see also Patchel, supra note 37, at 1051 ("Habeas is no longer a neutral
constitutional rights; instead it is part of the
procedural mechanism for litigating
substantive scope of some rights.").
220. See Cover & Alemikoff, supra note 50, at 1091-95. But cf. Jefries & Stuntz,
supranote 42, at 705-07 (discounting symbolic value of non-guilt-related rights).
221.

Cover & Alemikoff, supra note 50, at 1100.

222.

Id. at 1095.

223.

See Stacy, supranote 50, at 1376-1400.

224. Brown v Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 329 n.6 (1980) (citations omitted).
225. Griffith v Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,329-34 (1987) (White, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., and O'Connor, J., dissenting); United States v Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 568 (1982)
(White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., and O'Connor, J., dissenting).
226. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 563 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
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for Justice Marshall.' What the Court has come up with in its place is
Teague v Lane,' a grotesque version of LinkletterlStovall.2 9 Under the
so-called second Teague exception,' 0 a prisoner who has no remaining
direct appellate avenues can benefit from a new constitutional rule on habeas
if the rule is one of those exotic tenets of "ordered liberty""-those

"'watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental
fairness and accuracy of the crimnal proceeding." 2
Of the sevenz3 claims to which the Court has applied Teague's
second exception to nonretroactivity, none has satisfied it."In fact, five
of the seven decisions discuss the exception only in one sentence, while two
dismiss the claim in brief paragraphs. All seven race to unadorned
conclusions that say nothing about the relationship of the claimed error to an

accurate verdict. The Court concedes that "the precise contours of this

227

Michigan v Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 62 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

228.

489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion).

229. Cf. Althouse, supra note 113, at 949-53 (Teague relied on failure of Lmnkletter,
even though better solutions were available, and doctrine cast aside by Justice Harlan was
resurrected in his name); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1742 ("The Stovall regime
proved somewhat unpredictable."); Friedman, supra note 47, at 811-12.
230. The first exception to Teague's preference for nonretroactivity is when a new rule
places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal
law-making authority to proscribe." Teague v Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (O'Connor,
J.) (quoting Mackey v United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting in
part)).
231. Graham v Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903 (1993) (quoting Palko v Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
232. Saffle v Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311
(O'Connor, J.)).
233. See Gilmore v Taylor, 113 S.Ct. 2112,2119 (1993); Graham, 113 S.Ct. at 903;
Wright v West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2503 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); Sawyer
v Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241-43 (1990); Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495; Butler v McKellar, 494
U.S. 407,416 (1990); Teague, 489 U.S. at 314-15; see also Swindler v Lockhart, 495 U.S.
911, 914 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (rigid application of
state's change-of-venue rules applied in criminal case involving substantial pretrial publicity
diminishes "[t]he likelihood of an accurate conviction
when a defendant is tried by a jury
that has prejudged his case").
234. See Althouse, supranote 113, at 953 ("The second Teague exception seems to exist
only to remind us of just how highly exceptional and unusual a form of relief habeas is.").
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exception may be difficult to discern," 5 but, given that few rights having
the "primacy and centrality" 6 of an indigent felony defendant's right to

trial counsel

7

"have emerged,"" 8 the failure of any new-rule-seeking

petitioner to meet this exception is unsurprising

3 9'

Some new rules fail

for lack of watershedness of fundamental fairness, others for their dilute
effect on accuracy, still others for both. 2'
Consider Frank Teague himself. Teague claimed that his right to an
impartial jury required that the petit jury reflect a cross-section of his
community

The Court disagreed: the systematic exclusion of identifiable

groups from juries is not fundamental to fairness; in fact, it is "a far cry"

235. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495.
236. Id.
237

See Gideon v Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336-37 (1963).

238. Graham v Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903 (1993) (quoting Teague v Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 313 (1989)); see Friedman, supra note 47, at 824-26 (despite relatively recent bedrock
developments, and more certain to come alongside "technological and epistemological
advances," Court still "seems to suggest that enlightenment has come upon us and we need
look no further"); Karl N. Metzner, Note, Retroactivity, Habeas Corpus, and the Death
Penalty:An Unholy Alliance, 41 DUKE L.J. 160, 186 (1991) (death-penalty jurisprudence
dates back only to 1972); see also Harris v Vasquez, 901 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.) (Noonan, J.)
(Harris' claim to competent psychiatric assistance at penalty phase of capital trial comes
within second Teague exception), rev'd, 913 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1990) (odd opinion holding
that Harris' claim was novel and available at once).
239. See Gilbert S. Merritt, Access to Federal Courts in Habeas Corpus Cases, 58
TENN. L. REv 145, 146 (1990) (Teague means that defendants must show in advance, which
few can, "that the odds are great that the defendant would be acquitted upon retrial if his or
her proposition of law were adopted"); Rosenberg, supra note 70, at 367, 374 (second
exception is "arguably not an exception at all," but rather is dead end).
240. Cf. Adams v Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 293 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (rights
important enough to incorporate should be retroactive); Williams v United States, 401 U.S.
646, 666 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting in part) ("[]f the purposes of a new rule implicate
decisively the basic truth-determining function of the criminal trial,
the required
constitutional procedure itself would then stand as a concrete embodiment of 'the concept of
ordered liberty '"); Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner'sDilemma: Life in the Lower Federal
CourtsAfterTeaguev Lane, 69 N.C. L. REV 371,403-04 (1991) ("The interests of fairness
and accuracy are not mutually exclusive, and the examples of watershed rules given by the
Teague plurality would qualify under both analyses."); David R. Dow, Teague andDeath:
The Impact of CurrentRetroactivity Doctrine on CapitalDefendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 23, 38 (1991) ("[I]f the new procedures are genuinely implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, how does it make any sense
to call them 'new' 9 ").
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from it.24 The next Term, defendant Robert Sawyer attempted to rely on
the Court's intervemng decision in Caldwell v Mississippi,242 which held
cruel and unusual the execution of someone when the sentencing jury has
been misled into believing responsibility for the sentence rests elsewhere.243 The Court demed Sawyer relief because while Caldwell "was
designed as an enhancement of the accuracy of capital sentencing," it was
merely "added to an existing guarantee of due process" and thus was not an
"absolute prerequisite to fundamental fairness. "24 Even more recently,
when Kevin Taylor sought unsuccessfully to challenge his murder conviction
through an intervemng ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, the Court admitted that the trial court's jury instructions on
murder and manslaughter threatened to confuse the jury about the effect of
provocation on murder culpability 25 But Taylor lost anyway because the
need for a better instruction fell outside that "small core of rules requiring
'observance of those procedures that
are implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty "'246

During the same Term as Gilmore v Taylor,247 the Court decided
that Gary Graham's jury instruction obscured "his mitigating evidence of
youth, family background, and positive character traits," but did not
"seriously dimimsh the likelihood of obtaining an accurate
sentencing
proceeding."248 Before Taylor, Horace Butler's petition also foundered on
accuracy grounds. 9 When Butler sought to take advantage of a recent
241.

Teague v Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 314 (1989).

242.

472 U.S. 320 (1985).

243.

Caldwell v Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985).

244. Sawyer v Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 244 (1990) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 314).
But see id. at 255 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The majority's extensive effort in its 'new
rule' analysis to demonstrate that Caldwell's 'additional' protections marked a departure in

our Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence, however, seems disingenuous in lightof its conclusion
that the departure did not amount to much.").
245.

See Gilmore v Taylor, 113 S.Ct. 2112, 2119 (1993).

246.

Id. (quoting Graham v Collins, 113 S.Ct. 892, 903 (1993) (quoting Teague v

Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989))); see u.at 2123 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(offering only bare conclusion that neither accuracy nor fundamental fairness prongs of
second Teague exception were met).
247

113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993).

248.

Graham v Collins, 113 S.Ct. 892, 903 (1993).

249. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 416 (1990).
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decision preventing police from badgering suspects into waiving their right
to counsel, the Court replied only that the new decision might actually

decrease the likelihood of obtaining an accurate verdict.1 0 Finally, capital

defendant Robyn Leroy Parks lost on both the watershedness of his new rule
and on its accuracy-enhancing contribution." s Parks had objected to the
sentencing judge's antisympathy charge to the jury, which the Court

considered a quest by Parks for "an emotional chord," somehow a less
worthy inquiry than whether he "is morally deserving of the death sentence. ,"22
Never mind that the Court's conclusions in each of these cases may be
wrong. What is worse is that the reasoning mentioned above reproduces the

Court's entire investment in defending those conclusions. This brisk
approach to retroactivity-this "euphemistic dressing for maction"1 3-ultimately slights both fairness and accuracy, the values the Court
purports to celebrate.'

And the Court's willingness to disregard fairness

and accuracy is by no means unique to retroactivity jurisprudence. The
pervasive raise-or-waive and harmless error doctrines are as disagreeable to
accuracy as they are to the soft variables purported to comprise settled

notions of fairness.
Raise-or-waive rules and complementary examples of the Court's

unforgiving treatment of prisoners who violate the technical rules of trial,
appellate, and habeas pleading also obsess over innocence. Outside the
context of capital sentencing, the concept of "actual" or substantive

250. Id. (citing Arizona v Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (police cannot avoid
suspect's decision to deal with police only through counsel by confining subsequent
interrogation to separate offense)).
251. See Saffle v Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990).
252. Id. But see id. at 507 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Rules ensuring the jury's ability
to consider mitigating evidence guarantee that the jury acts with full information when
formulating a moral judgment about the defendant's conduct.").
253.

Cover & Alemikoff, supranote 50, at 1100.

254. Opposition to the second Teague exception's rights-choking version of guiltinnocence theory appears sporadically in separate opinions, see Gilmore v Taylor, 113 S.
Ct. 2112, 2123-30 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Sawyer v Smith, 497 U.S. 227,254-59
(1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Saffle, 494 U.S. at505-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Teague
v Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 318-26 (1989) (Stevens, I., concurring); rd. at 333-44 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), and academic commentary, see Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 788; Fallon &
Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1774 n.231 (deriding Court for unauthorized ordering of rights and
for subordinating other values to accurate verdicts).
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innocence is, in the Court's view, "easy to grasp."

5

So easy, in fact, that

nowhere in the Court's opinions does any further explication of this concept
appear.

The Court's silence is troubling, given that innocence is a

complicated concept, rife with moral content retained in mens
rea and
56
defenses that fully or partially justify or excuse a criminal act.

Proof of whether a defendant committed a crime is mediated by the
rules of evidence and other basics of trial and pretrial practice. Some of
these rules and practices enhance our understanding of what the defendant
did,' some obscure it,"8 some do both, 9 and some do neither.'

Notwithstanding the varying levels of accuracy-influencing constitutional
claims, the Justices assume they will know an innocent prisoner, frequently
referred to as the victim of a "miscarriage of justice,"'" when they see

one.262 When a prisoner fails to develop facts26 or preserve a claim for
review,"

files her appeal late,'

or badgers or sandbags a federal court

with a successe266 or preserved-but-abandoned 7 claim, she still will
receive habeas review if she proves that the State probably26 has "convict-

255. Sawyer v Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2519-20 (1992).
256. Cf. Arenella, supra note 3, at 197-98 ("Our substantive criminal law requires a
moral evaluation of the actor's conduct by including some mental element (e.g., purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, or negligence) in its definition of most offenses and by its
recognition of affirmative defenses that either justify the defendant's conduct or excuse it.");
Dow, supranote 240, at 40-41 (what influences jury is mysterious).
257 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
258. See generallyMapp v Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
259. See generally Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
260. See generally Rose v Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
261. See Sawyer v Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518-19 (1992); Wainwright v Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).
262. The Court's attention is on standards of pleading and review, not on the meaning
of innocence. Cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 786-87 (revealing inadequacies of these
standards).
263. Keeney v Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1720 (1992).
264. Murray v Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 490-92 (1986).
265. Coleman v Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2564-65 (1991).
266. Kuhlmann v Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 & n.17 (1986) (plurality opinion).
267 McCleskey v Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1474 (1991).
268. Carrier,477 U.S. at 495.
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ed the wrong person of the crime. '29 Just what would satsify this
standard remains unclear. Indeed, it is telling that in two decades of review,
no Supreme Court litigant has done so.
'
Although the "natural usage"27
of the term "actual innocence" "does

not translate easily into the context of
the sentencing phase of a trial on
a capital offense,"" t the Court applies it to undeveloped, defaulted,
successive, or abusive claims there too, despite the self-consciously moral
judgments of death sentencing.'
To take advantage of the "very narrow
exception"2' 73 to the normal rules of preclusion, the Court directs habeas

courts

to

reach

the

merits

of

a

claim-individualized,

not

categorical2 74 -highly suggestive of the prisoner's innocence of the
underlying capital offense.275 Innocence alone, however, is not a constitu-

269. Sawyer v Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514,2519 (1992). A petitioner's failure to comply
with orderly procedures also is forgiven if she had good "cause" for her error. The narrow
instances of cause lie when counsel was ineffective at trial or on the first appeal as of right,
when petitioner's claim was unavailable to her at the time she was required to raise it, or if
the state interfered with her timely filing of the claim as when, for example, the warden fails
to file the prisoner's papers when requested to do so. Cause, coupled with a showing of
"actual prejudice" flowing from the habeas court's refusal to hear a forfeited claim, lets a
habeas petitioner avoid forfeit and requires the habeas court to reach the merits of her claim.
See Friedman, supra note 7, at 288-302.
270. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2520.
271. Dugger v Adams, 489 U.S. 401,412 n.6 (1989); Smith v Murray, 477 U.S. 527,
537 (1986).
272. See Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2527-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Kuhlmann
v Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,471 n.7 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (capital sentencing is "only
a decision made by the representatives of the community whether the prisoner shall live or
die")).
273. Id. at 2520.
274. See Sawyer v Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 256 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (second
Teague exception, unlike the miscarriage-of-justice exception, is "rule-, not petitioner-,
specific"); JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 22A.1, at 118 n.23 (Supp. 1993) (same); Patchel, supra note 37, at 969 (individualized
innocence exception to cause and prejudice makes sense because it prevents guilty defendants
from obtaining relief just by raising right sort of claim and prevents innocents from being
denied for having raised wrong sort of claim).
275. See Sawyer v Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2521-23, 2525 (1992) (innocence in
capital sentencing requires petitioner to show by clear and convincing evidence that absent
constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found him eligible for execution); cf. id.
at 2533 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) ("It is heartlessly perverse to impose a more
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tional claim, "but instead a gateway through which [one] must pass to have
'
[an] otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits."276
When couched only in terms of due process and not some other guarantee,
the claim requires an "extraordinarily high" showing of innocence.m
Also falling within the exception are prisoners whose claimed errors

undermine their death-eligibility 278 To avoid conflict with other doctrines
of preclusion, the Court's conception of death-eligibility considers only

errors in aggravation, not mitigation.

9

The theory behind this pastiche of accuracy-first rulings is that each
involves a sort of default leading to forfeit: the defendant is punished for
raising clamis she (or much more likely, her attorney) should have raised or

pursued earlier; or, having raised or pursued them, for not leaving well
enough alone.' Procedural regularity, the argument runs, promotes the
values of federalism and finality and reduces the friction between the state
and federal systems. The Court even claims that procedural regularity
promotes accuracy (but with no regard for the preference for false acquittals)
by requiring that issues be presented when evidence and memories are fresh
enough to properly assess the claim and retry the prisoner if necessary
Simply put, unless the prisoner can demonstrate her substantive innocence,
it is her attorney's course of pleading, not the Constitution, that matters.M

stringent standard of proof to avoid a miscarriage of justice in a capital case than in a
noncapital case.").
276. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993). Justice Blackmun found this
aspect of Herrera"perverse." See id. at 880-81. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Having
held that a prisoner who is incarcerated in violation of the Constitution must show he is
actually innocent to obtain relief, the majority would now hold that a prisoner who is
actually innocent must show a constitutional violation to obtain relief.").
277 See id. at 879. For a fine discussion of Herrera, see J. Thomas Sullivan,
"Reformng" Federal Habeas Corpus: The Cost to Federalism; the Burden for Defense
Counsel; and the Loss of Innocence, 61 UMKC L. REV 291, 314-26 (1992).
278. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2522-23 (1992).
279. Id. at 2522 n.13.
280. See Seidman, supranote 2, at 466-69 (discussing tension between jurisprudence
of guilt and innocence and requirement of procedural correctness).
281. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
282. Cf. Kit Kinports, Habeas Corpus, Qualified Immunity, and Crystal Balls:
Predictingthe Course of ConstitutionalLaw, 33 ARIZ. L. REV 115, 116 (1991) (Court
more prone to forgive errors ofjudges and government officials than of defendants or their
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Naturally this highly individualized approach to defaulted claims has been
a disaster for prisoners and their competent, but mstaken, attorneys; the
State wins a lopsided share of disputes decided under a standard which

places both the risk of loss and the burden of proof on the prisoner.'
The Court first refused to adopt a more categorical approach to
defaulted claims in 1982. Lincoln Isaac sought habeas relief from an
aggravated assault conviction on the ground that Ohio law had re-allocated
the burden of proving self-defense in his favor after his conviction.'
Despite the novelty of the claim, Isaac's counsel failed to show "cause" for
ignoring Ohio's contemporaneous objection rule; thus, the Court ruled

against Isaac without reaching the merits of his constitutional claim.'
That complicated case featured Isaac's argument that no claim
affecting the truth-finding aspect of the trial should be subject to forfeit. 86
In fact, the case credited with spreading the raise-or-waive rule at issue
involved a defaulted Mirandaclaim-a "defect" which was "serious," but

not serious enough to "affect the determination of guilt at trial.
For
Justice O'Connor's majority, the familiar "costs" of overlooking a prisoner's
flouting of orderly state procedures "do not depend upon the type of claim

attorneys).
283.

See 17A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 4266.1, at 467 (2d ed. 1988) ("To date no such extraordinary case has been found.");
Friedman, supra note 7, at 320-21 ("[A] new trial, with a shifted burden of proof, is
precisely what [recent habeas cases] require."). But cf. Pilchak v Camper, 935 F.2d 145,
148 (8th Cir. 1991) (extending narrow exception to cause-prejudice analysis when
defendant is unjustly sentenced); Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375, 380-81 (8th Cir. 1991)
(holding that ex post facto sentence fell within actual innocence exception to cause-prejudice
rule); Henderson v. Sargent, 926 F.2d 706, 713-14 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that ineffective
assistance of counsel created doubts about reliability of verdict).
284. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 111-12 (1982). Isaac's trial occurred after Ohio
enacted OHIO REv CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (Baldwin 1993) (effective Jan. 1, 1974)
(burden of "going forward" with evidence of affirmative defense is on accused), but before
State v Robinson, 351 N.E.2d 88, 93 (Ohio 1976) (defendant has burden of production,
not persuasion). Isaac flouted Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 30, which requires
contemporaneous objections to jury instructions. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 124-25.
285. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 135.
286. Id. at 129.
287 Id.
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raised by the prisoner."'
Thus, the raise-or-waive doctrine would bow
to no class of clamis, regardless of their truth-finding pedigree.

But Isaac was asserting a right important enough to have been held
retroactive, 289 and, at the time, one whose violation required automatic
reversal if noticed on direct appeal. 2' As Justice Brennan pointed out in
his dissent, unlike Mirandaor Mapp errors, "a defendant's right to a trial at
which the burden of proof has been constitutionally allocated can never be
violated without rendering the entire trial result untrustworthy "291 An
error of that magnitude might be subject to deliberate waiver, but never to
inadvertent forfeit. 212
If Justice Brennan had gotten his way, how would decisions of
inclusion and exclusion regarding forfeited claims proceed? What would the

substantive integrity of an accuracy-based theory, however conscientiously
arrived at, look like? If accuracy is the key, but other values also matter,
then which trump which, and when?29 Other values may themselves be
subject to ordering as well. For instance, Cover and Aleinikoff saw a
difference between "symbolic" or "evocative" rights2 4 and "cherished
ideals. "2I Even if we were to develop some formula or guiding principles

for drawing these distinctions, Withrow v Williams" would render them

288. Id.
289. Id. at 149-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Ivan V v City of New York, 407
U.S. 203, 204 (1972)).
290. See Bollenbach v United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1946).
291.

Isaac, 456 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

292. See Pay v Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
293. Rights-ordering has occurred "in a more ad hoc fashion than it would have if it had
accepted innocence as the only value worth furthering through habeas proceedings." Patchel,
supra note 37, at 1046-47; see also Sawyer v Whitley, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2527-28 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (innocence-matters approach leaves other values
"debased, and indeed, rendered largely irrelevant"); Smith v Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 543
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (values other than accuracy should be reflected in our
conception of law and justice); Murray v Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 520 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("The criminal justice system
is structured both to determine the guilt or
innocence of defendants and to resolve all questions incident to that determination, including
the constitutionality of the procedures leading to the verdict.").
294.

Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 50, at 1091.

295. Id. at 1093.
296.

113 S.Ct. 1745 (1993).
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illusory If, as Withrow suggests, any claim not necessarily divorced from
accuracy is too important to overlook, then the class of guilt-related claims
would be grossly overinclusive. A standard-which well may be the basis
of Withrow-dedicatedto the vindication of that complex of values (personal
autonomy, limited government, adversarial balance) too important to
subordinate to the blunt instrument of accuracy-first theory would sweep just
as far, excluding nothing. Withrow, therefore, unwittingly made reversal or
refinement of Isaac as infeasible as it is unlikely
Isaacreveals the intractable choice between accuracy and other values
and also demonstrates the Court's clear preference for individualized over
categorical standards of review; but Isaac accomplishes these ends no more
obviously than does the Court's harmless error jurisprudence. Between
1967, when the Court wrote Chapman v California,2 ' and 1991, when
it decided Arizona v Fulmnante,29s the range of constitutional trial errors
forgivable on appeal went from none to nearly all.2' To avoid reversal
under Chapman, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error was harmless, which means that the error did not contribute to the
verdict."° Harmless error doctrine is at bottom only nominally categorical
and almost entirely individualized: a few errors are categorically insulated
from its reach;3" all others may be shrugged off if the reviewing court is
sufficiently convinced of the defendant's guilt."°

297

386 U.S. 18 (1967).

298.

111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).

299. See Rose v Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986) (defendant with competent counsel
and unbiased judge would be subject to "a strong presumption that any other errors that may
have occurred are subject to harmless error analysis"); Stacy, supra note 50, at 1381-82
(listing potentially harmless errors); Stacy & Dayton, supra note 43, at 84-85 and

accompanying notes (same).
300. See Yates v Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 1893 (1991) ("To say that an error did not
'contribute' to the ensuing verdict is

to find that error unimportant in relation to

everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.");
Chapman v California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
301. See 3 LAFAvE &ISRAEL, supra note 71, § 26.6, at 88-94 (Supp. 1991) (harmless
error is at times inapplicable to avoid double-counting prejudice components in underlying
error).
302. See Jeffrey Rosen, Bad Noose, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 4, 1993, at 15. Although
Chapman eschewed overemphasis on the weight of untainted evidence, Chapman, 386 U.S.
at 23, the analysis is in effect a counterfactual inquiry into what the jury would have done
absent the error. See Milton v Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1972) ("The jury
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Term by term, the Court's Chapman analysis swallowed error after
error before it culminated in Fulminante, in which the Court deemed
potentially harmless any error whose unpact may "be quantitatively
assessed" by studying the record. 33 For example, despite their intimacy
with accuracy,jury instructions containing unconstitutional presumptions can
be harmless, 3" as can coerced confessions. 0 5
Crooked judges, 3"
3
°
grand jury discrumnation,
and demal of the rights to counsel,1°s to
3
self-representation, " or to a public trial,310 conversely, are "structural
defect[s] affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds." 3"

Because these "structural" errors prevent the trial from "reliably serv[ing]
its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence,"31 they
require automatic reversal.
was presented with overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt
"); Francis A. Allen,
A Serendipitous Trek Through the Advance-Sheet Jungle: CriminalJustice in the Courtsof
Review, 70 IOWA L. REv 311, 332 (1985) ("ITihe staunch belief of the reviewing courts in
the guilt of the appellants seeking reversals
transcend[s] all variations of formula and all
problematic calculations about what juries might have done had the error complained of been
avoided."). See generally Robert N. Strassfeld, If
Counterfactualsin the Law, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REv 339, 350 n.54 (1992) (on "counterfactual dread" in review of criminal
convictions).
303.

Arizona v Fulmmante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991).

304. See Pope v Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-02 (1987); Rose v Clark, 478 U.S. 570,
579-80 (1986). But see Chapman, 386 U.S. at 44 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result); id.
at 52 n.7 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Bollenbach v United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614-15
(1946)).
305. See Fulminante, IIIS. Ct. at 1265. All three opinions in Chapmansaid otherwise.
In his, Justice Harlan suggested that all errors with a "devastating" or "inherently
indeterminate" impact on the jury require automatic reversal, as would "certain types of
[intentional] official misbehavior." Chapman v California, 386 U.S. 18, 52 n.7 (1967)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). For Chief Justice Rehnquist's Fulmmante majority, however, the
impact of any error visible on the record, even the most devastating evidentiary bombshell,
could, and from now on would, be coolly assessed by an appellate court.
306.

See Tumey v Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927).

307

See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 261 (1986).

308.

See Gideon v Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337 (1963).

309.

See McKaskle v Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984).

310.

See Waller v Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984).

311.

Arizona v Fulmmante, Ill S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991).

312.

Rose v Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986).

RIGHTS-ORDERING ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS

Inevitably, the structural-nonstructural dichotomy of the harmless
error rule elevates some dignitary norms, such as equality and participation, despite the rule's self-described accuracy basis. In this context,
dignitary norms matter only when coupled with a right that does not
involve the prosecution's "presentation of the case to the jury "33 But
why should grand jury discrimination or demals of self-representation
warrant zero tolerance when, "structural" or not, their ability to undermine
our confidence in the accuracy of a guilty verdict is at most dilute?
Certainly these rights promote a range of interests, but accuracy least of
all. 3 ' Despite their lack of guilt-relatedness, the harmless error rule is
inapposite for some violations."' Guilt-related or not, if some governmental misbehavior is hard to uncover, application of harmless error
31 6
doctrine will only drive the undesired activity further underground.
Consequently, the harmless error rule will overlook errors that affect the
central purpose of the criminal trial, but not, perhaps ironically, those rules
with ancillary purposes.3 17

So goes the categorical aspect of the doctrine. Again, it highlights
the nagging if not fatal challenge to the Court's claimed commitment to
accuracy, a challenge profoundly skeptical about whether that commitment
can realistically be dropped to the individualized level in settings remote
from the "main event" of trial. However realistic, the Court not only has

313. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1264.
314. Honoring the right of self-representation will in most cases distort, not enhance,
the accuracy of the verdict.
315. See Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1256 (White, J., dissenting); United States v
Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 473-74 & n.13 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fallon & Meltzer,
supra note 34, at 1772 n.222.
316. See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 43, at 95-98, 106-07 (because facts establishing
prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony, or failure to divulge exculpatory evidence
on request are exclusively within prosecutor's possession, they are easily concealed from
defendant).
317 Compare id. at 94 (Harmless error is good for all truth-furthering rights, but
when it comes to truth-neutral or truth-impairing rights, "[c]ourts must focus on the
purpose in question, not the impact of the error on the outcome of the
particular
proceeding. If constitutional error has not frustrated that purpose, the error is harmless and
the court should uphold the conviction unless reversal is necessary to deter future
violations.") with Stacy, supranote 50, at 1371 n.6 ("[A] sharp distinction between truthoversimplifies the matter.").
furthering and truth-impairing rights
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put habeas courts in the business of determimng individualized guilt, but
the Court also requires that they do so under a standard that makes state
court decisions virtually conclusive of the defendant's postconviction
travels.
On the same day it decided Withrow, the Court handed down Brecht
v Abrahamson,"8 which relaxed the prosecution's burden for proving
harmlessness on habeas. A prosecutor's comments about Todd Brecht's
silence after being arrested and apprised of his rights violated the implicit
assurance that his "right to silence" would be honored. a 9 These improper comments, known as Doyle 320 error, occurred at Brecht's trial, at
which a jury convicted Brecht of the murder of his brother-in-law 32 The
question before the Court was whether habeas courts should assess the
impact of the error on a jury under a less exacting standard than a court on
direct appeal. 3 2
A 5-4 Court, through Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that although
Doyle is a core element of due process and no mere prophylaxis, 323 a
Doyle error is not structural, and thus is subject to harmless error analysis.324 Not the Chapman variety, however, but a weaker variant. 3"
From now on, habeas courts must test harmlessness under Kotteakos v
United States,31 which requires reversal only when the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."327
Federal courts already know Kotteakos, Rehnquist explained, and because
Chapman still applies on direct review, knowledge of that standard will
continue to pay off there and "possib[ly]" in "unusual" habeas cases

318. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
319.

See Brecht v Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1716-17 (1993).

320.

Doyle v Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).

321.

Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1714-15.

322. Id. at 1716, 1721.
323. See id. at 1717 (quoting Abrahamson v Brecht, 944 F.2d 1363, 1370 (7th Cir.
1991) (calling Doyle "a prophylactic rule designed to protect another prophylactic rule
[Miranda]from erosion or misuse")).
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1721-22.
326.

328 U.S. 750 (1946).

327

Kotteakos v United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946).
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featuring "deliberate and especially egregious error," or error combined with
really bad prosecutorial misconduct, even absent "actual prejudice." 3I
Although Kotteakos previously had applied only to nonconstitutional
errors, Chief Justice Rehnquist felt Chapman's reasonable-doubt standard
was too demanding for habeas, which plays only a back-up role to
presumptively proper state court proceedings. After the obligatory reference
to "deterrence"-a job that Kotteakos can adequately handle-Rehnquist
recommended that reversal on habeas be saved for the "grievously
wronged," the victim of "extreme malfunctions" in state court processes.
Thus, what justifies reversal on direct appeal might not justify reversal on
habeas. 29
Justice Stevens concurred and wrote separately to emphasize that
33 standard and not a pushover.
Kotteakos is an "appropriately demanding""
Although three Justices wrote dissenting opinions, 33i only Justice
O'Connor seemed troubled by the majority's subordination of accuracy,
which showed her that the majority took habeas too lightly 332 Because
harmless-error analysis (unlike the exclusionary rule) can threaten accuracy,
observed O'Connor, only the full force of Chapman's reasonable-doubt
standard can restore faith in a verdict undermined by constitutional
error.333 Chapman thus expresses that the State, not the wronged prisoner,
should bear the risk of an unreliable verdict.3 To simplify the Court's
328. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722 n.9. The prosecutor's comments here comprised only
2 of 900 pages of transcript and only a few minutes in a 4-day trial in which 25 witnesses

testified. Id. at 1715.
329. Id. at 1719-21.

330. Id. at 1723 (Stevens, J., concurring). Kotteakos keeps the burden on the
prosecution, makes the entire record pertinent (increasing the ways in which error can infect
the trial), is de novo (since it is a mixed question of law and fact), and focuses on influence,

not outcome. Different outcomes thus will not come from the phrasing of the standards, but
from the quality of the judgment of those applying them. Id.

331. See id. at 1725 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1728 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
332.

Id. at 1728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

333.

Id. at 1730-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

334. Id. at 1729 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Just whom Brecht would shoulder with the
Kotteakos standard is not altogether clear. The majority seems to place the burden on the
defendant/petitioner, id. at 1722, Stevens puts iton the government, id. at 1723 (Stevens, J.,
concurring), and White says the majority definitely puts it on the defendant, id. at 1727
(White, J., dissenting).

51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 669 (1994)

usually Byzantine approach to habeas, O'Connor would apply Chapman to
3 35
all nonstructural errors without regard to the values they promote.
If Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion did not address Justice
O'Connor's effort to hold accurate verdicts in high esteem, it is more likely
due to his view of habeas than to his take on the importance of accuracy in
criminal trials.
Pulling from conservatives' store of soft vanables-"finality," "comity," "federalism," "deterren[ce]," and "social
costs" 336-Rehnquist's habeas is not on a constant alert to fix constitutional
error, truth-furthering or otherwise. Instead, Rehnquist waits for the
attorney to cease to act like an attorney, for cheating judges and lying
prosecutors-for the trial to cease to look like a trial; as for investigative
practices, civil or other alternative remedies sufficiently redress all but the
most nefarious wrongs. Rehnquist's habeas is a corrective mechanism
reserved for an exclusive group: the "grievously wronged," most of whom
will have been vindicated long before reaching a federal habeas court. For
those who are not, the road may get rougher, but the truly deserving will
prevail, even under the most demanding standards of pleading and proof.
Despite Chief Justice Rehnquist's claim to the contrary, we have every
reason to suspect the competence of trial judges if they err so often that their
errors require a separate body of law Whether driven by the Court's
frustration with the frequency of constitutional trial error, empathy for
fallible trial judges, certainty about the potential superfluousness of almost
any error, or uncanny willingness to demand trial-like work from the
appellate sidelines, the categorical aspect of harmless error analysis excludes
so few errors from its ambit that it becomes no category at all. Piled on the
greedy hoard of potentially harmless errors is a standard under which, before
relief will lie, a federal habeas court now must find that the state appellate
courts which forgave the error under a "pro-defendant" standard erred even
under a "pro-prosecution" standard. 3 7 This threatens to preclude federal

335. Id. at 1730-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
336.

Id. at 1720-21.

337 Cf. id. at 1725-28 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that Chapman correctly placed
burden on State to prove that constitutional error "did not contribute to the verdict obtained");
Daniel J. Meltzer, HarmlessErrorand ConstitutionalRemedies,61 U. CHI.L. REv 1,37-38
(1994) (dilution of Chapman in Brechtmight have been less likely if source of harmless error

rule-which is neither strictly constitutional nor strictly statutory-were closely examined);
Sullivan, supra note 277, at 306-07
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habeas relief whenever a state appellate court finds an error harmless under
Chapman-hardlythe basis of a meaningful search for accurate verdicts.338
Conclusion
Everyone agrees that accurate verdicts are important. Everyone
agrees as well that there would be no procedures to evaluate without criminal
laws to enforce. Despite their derivative nature, once we have procedures,
they must be fair and decent, not just efficient and precise. Thus, the
tension between reliable verdicts and the means by which they are sought has
stunted development of a principled accuracy-first theory of postconviction
review And it could not be any other way in a system dedicated to
promoting potentially accuracy-hindering ideals like fairness and procedural
regularity
Given the unresolvable conflict between accuracy and dignitary norms,
I doubt that the answer is to fight rights-ordering if acquiescence would
soften the blow that the nonretroactivity, procedural default, and harmless
error doctrines have delivered. That forms one of my gripes with
Withrow-if some sort of triage is necessary (I know that the number of
prisoners is as much to blame for the number of prisoner petitions as is
Brown or Fay, but still .), then Stoning Mirandamight be a way to begin
to recalibrate habeas on a categorical, rather than an individualized, basis.
A meaningful commitment to categorical rulemaking could in turn insulate
more errors from harmless error analysis, forgive more clais from forfeit,
and maybe even produce a more realistic alternative to Teague. This, I
think, is simply an updating of what I call the "hopeful account" of accuracyfirst theory suggested by Professors Cover and Alemikoff, but that has been
about the extent of my task.

338. But cf. John H. Blume & Stephen P Garvey, HarmlessErrorin FederalHabeas
CorpusAfterBrechtv. Abrahamson, 35 WM. &MARY L. REV 163,181,195 (1993) (Brecht
does not substantially alter Chapman standard of review).

